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Sectoral labor supply shortage is a cause of concern in many OECD countries and has raised support for
immigration as a potential remedy. In this paper, we derive a general equilibrium model with overlapping
generations, where natives require a compensating wage diﬀerential for working in one sector rather than
in another. We identify price and wage eﬀects of immigration on three diﬀerent groups of natives: the
young working in one of two sectors and the old. We determine the outcome of a majority vote on
immigration into a given sector as well as the social optimum. The main ﬁndings are that i) the old
determine the majority voting outcome of positive immigration into both sectors, if natives are not
mobile across sectors, ii) the young determine the majority voting outcome of zero immigration into both
sectors, if natives are mobile across sectors, iii) the social optimum is smaller than or equal to the majority
voting outcome, and iv) sector-speciﬁc immigration is not always a substitute for native mobility across
sectors.
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11 Introduction
Immigration policy is one of the most pressing issues in developed countries that face large and growing
numbers of migrants, and it is just as controversial. While immigration is opposed because of expected
negative wage eﬀects on native workers, it is also often promoted as a way to alleviate labor shortages
in speciﬁc labor market segments, skill- or occupation-wise. In a situation of excess labor demand, an
increase of labor supply via immigration is an alternative to an increase in prices to achieve labor market
equilibrium. The existing literature on the labor market eﬀects of immigration typically studies wage
eﬀects in a one-sector economy, but does not consider price eﬀects of immigration (Card 2001, Borjas
2003, Ottaviano and Peri 2005). Recent exceptions are Cortes (2006), who estimates price eﬀects of
low-skilled immigration in the U.S. and Felbermayr and Kohler (2007), who derive wage and price eﬀects
of immigrants with heterogeneous skills, taking skill-speciﬁc quotas as given.
Immigration policies that aim to increase native welfare have to take into account both wage and price
eﬀects, as it is real wages, not nominal ones, which determine the overall welfare impact of immigra-
tion. Existing immigration policies reﬂect these concerns. A number of countries identify occupational
shortages regularly and use these as criteria to favor or facilitate immigration.1 In Europe, a standard
procedure is to subject potential immigrants to an employment test, where an employer needs to declare
his need of the immigrant for a job that cannot be ﬁlled by any resident qualiﬁed candidate.2 In the
United Kingdom, a sectors-based migrant worker scheme was introduced in 2002 for low-skill jobs in the
sectors of hotels and catering, and food manufacturing.3 In Australia, potential immigrants in required
occupations receive extra points in the immigrant selection process.4
In this paper, we derive optimal policies to select immigration by sector, taking into account both wage
and price eﬀects of immigration. We analyze a labor market that is segmented into two sectors. Inter-
sectoral mobility is restricted because natives exhibit sector-speciﬁc work preferences: for given job
characteristics, they require a compensating wage diﬀerential for working in one sector rather than in
the other.5 6 In reality, job preferences are only one reason for wage diﬀerentials existing in the absence
of productivity diﬀerences. Our model applies equally to restricted mobility due to geographic moving
costs between sectors, costs associated with the loss of sector-speciﬁc human capital or the necessary
acquisition of new human capital.7 Natives are heterogeneous in terms of the amount of their required
1See OECD (2006).
2In nursing occupations, in particular, labor market shortages are already present in many countries and are likely to
expand with the ageing of native populations. This is highlighted by heated political debates on the legal employment of
immigrants in nursing occupations in Austria recently.
3Institute for Employment Studies (2006).
4Miller (1999).
5Klaver and Visser (1999) ﬁnd for diﬀerent sectors in the Dutch economy that their image is not good enough, at the
going wage rate, to attract a suﬃcient number of workers, even if supply is abundant. Compare OECD (2003, p. 104).
6Borjas (2007) mentions in his blog the health sector in the UK as an example of a ’low-wage ghetto’, which ’drives
natives into alternative, better-paid options and fulﬁlls the prophecy that there are some jobs that natives just won’t do.’
7According to Zimmermann et al. (2007), there is evidence for regional and sectoral wage diﬀerentials within occupations,
which suggests that mobility is insuﬃcient even within a relatively homogeneous labor market (see DeNew and Schmidt
1994, M¨ oller and Bellmann (1996) and Haisken, DeNew and Schmidt (1999) for Germany).
2wage diﬀerential or moving cost.8 This is the main diﬀerence in our model between natives and migrants.
Since we are interested in selective immigration policies targeted at speciﬁc sectors or occupations, we
assume that natives and migrants are homogeneous within sectors.
The second key feature of our model is an overlapping generations structure. We derive optimal sector-
speciﬁc immigration for three diﬀerent groups of natives, the young working in one of two sectors, and
the old. Intuitively, one would expect that old (retired) generations have a stronger preference for
migration than young generations, since they do not experience potentially negative wage eﬀects, but
only positive price eﬀects. Further, one would expect that old generations do not have a strong preference
for migration to be speciﬁc to one or the other sector of the economy, while young generations should have
such preferences, since their wages are directly aﬀected by the sector-speciﬁc structure of the migration
ﬂow. We show that the old support immigration into both sectors, while the young oppose immigration
into ’their’ sector. However, the attitude of the young will be diﬀerent, if they can move from one sector
to the other as a response to a change in wage diﬀerentials due to immigration, given their sector-speciﬁc
work preference. We derive the optimal amount of sector-speciﬁc immigration under two regimes, one
where the sector choice of workers is ﬁxed, and one where it is endogenous to migration.
Given that diﬀerent groups are aﬀected diﬀerently, what is the likely outcome on sector-speciﬁc immigra-
tion policies? We employ majority voting as a simple means of aggregating individual preferences and
ﬁnd that, in the case of ﬁxed sector choice, immigration quota are strictly positive in both sectors. In
the case of endogenous sector choice, immigration quota are likely to be smaller in both sectors, because
while workers still oppose immigration into ’their’ sector, they now experience a negative wage eﬀect also
from immigration into the other sector. Numerical simulations show that immigration quota are zero
for a range of existing parameter value estimates. We then compare these politically determined quota
to the quota that maximize social welfare. Socially optimal immigration quota are likely to be smaller
in the case of ﬁxed sector choice, because the majority voting outcome is determined by the preferences
of the old, who do not take the negative eﬀect of immigration on wages into account. In numerical
simulations, we ﬁnd that socially optimal immigration is zero under both ﬁxed and endogenous sector
choice for chosen parameter values.
Finally, we compare the welfare eﬀects of immigration in the two regimes of ﬁxed and endogenous sector
choice of natives. In particular, one might expect that sector-speciﬁc immigration is a substitute, in terms
of social welfare, for native mobility across sectors. This expectation is inherent in a number of recent
policy proposals that suggest enhancing the mobility of native workers as an alternative to immigration
when dealing with labor shortages.9 However, depending on relative labor supply in the two sectors, it is
possible that the welfare eﬀect of immigration is higher with than without native mobility. We identify
conditions under which the substitutability result does, and does not, hold.
8We could also think of the two sectors as a low- and a high-skill sector, with natives being heterogeneous with regard
to their cost of investing in human capital.
9Compare Zimmermann et al. (2007), p.73. They suggest ﬁnancial incentives such as tax exemptions for relocation
or commuting costs as a way to increase inter-sectoral native mobility. The same idea was pronounced by the Austrian
minister for economics and labor in 2007.
32 The model
Consider a two-country, two-period overlapping-generations economy. Every agent is born with one unit
of inelastically supplied labor. Labor is perfectly substitutable within sectors. The labor endowments of
countries I and II are N > 0 and M > 0, respectively, and constant over time.10
2.1 Production
In country I, there are two production sectors. The output of sector A (XA) is non-tradable and hence
can be consumed only in country I. The output of sector B (XB) is tradable and hence can be consumed
in both countries. In country II, there is only one sector whose output (XC) is tradable. The production





i , γi ∈ (0,1), i ∈ {A,B,C} (1)
where Li and Ki denote labor and capital input used by sector i, respectively. Each sector is under
perfect competition: the unit price of a production factor is equal to the value of its marginal product.
Therefore, the sectoral wages are






where pi is the unit price of the output by sector i. We assume perfectly mobile capital such that there
is only one interest rate that is equal to the value of the marginal product of capital in every sector, i.e.,
∀i,












where δ ≥ 0 is the common rate of discounting future consumption; x(1) = (xA (1),xB (1),xC (1)) is the
ﬁrst-period consumption bundle; and x(2) = (xA (2),xB (2),xC (2)) is the second-period consumption
bundle. It implies that utility is invariant and additive over time. We assume ∂uI/∂xi > 0 and
∂2uI/∂2xi < 0. More speciﬁcally,
uI(x) ≡ αlnxA + β lnxB + (1 − α − β)lnxC, α,β,α + β ∈ (0,1). (5)
10The set-up of a dynamic model that would allow to consider population growth over time could be an interesting avenue
for further research.
4The objective of the agent is to maximize the utility function subject to p(1) · x(1) ≤ w − s and
p(2) · x(2) ≤ (1 + r)s where s is savings. Due to non-satiating utility and no bequest, the combined
budget constraint is p(1) · x(1) + p(2) · x(2)/(1 + r) = w.
We assume that the interest rate to the ﬁrst-period savings is paid in the very beginning of the second
period. The ﬁrst-period savings are used as capital input in the ﬁrst period, and the interest rate is
determined via equation (3) in the same period.
For each agent in country II, we replace uI in (4) by
uII(x) ≡ θlnxB + (1 − θ)lnxC, θ ∈ (0,1) (6)
because the output of sector A in country I is not tradable.
Accordingly, we obtain the following demand functions:
xA
A (1) = eα
wA(1)
pA(1) , xA
A (2) = (1 − e)α
wA(1)
pA(2) (1 + r(1)),
xA
B (1) = eβ
wA(1)
pB(1), xA
B (2) = (1 − e)β
wA(1)
pB(2) (1 + r(1)),
xA
C (1) = e(1 − α − β)
wA(1)
pC(1), xA
C (2) = (1 − e)(1 − α − β)
wA(1)
pC(2) (1 + r(1)),
xB
A (1) = eα
wB(1)
pA(1) , xB
A (2) = (1 − e)α
wB(1)
pA(2) (1 + r(1)),
xB
B (1) = eβ
wB(1)
pB(1) , xB
B (2) = (1 − e)β
wB(1)
pB(2) (1 + r(1)),
xB
C (1) = e(1 − α − β)
wB(1)
pC(1) , xB
C (2) = (1 − e)(1 − α − β)
wB(1)
pC(2) (1 + r(1)),
xC
A (1) = 0, xC
A (2) = 0,
xC
B (1) = eθ
wC(1)
pB(1), xC
B (2) = (1 − e)θ
wC(1)
pB(2) (1 + r(1)),
xC
C (1) = e(1 − θ)
wC(1)
pC(1) , xC
C (2) = (1 − e)(1 − θ)
wC(1)
pC(2) (1 + r(1)),
where e ≡ (1 + δ)/(2 + δ) and the superscript indicates the employment sector, e.g., xB
A (1) is the ﬁrst-
period demand for the output of sector A by an agent who is employed in sector B. In the second period,
agents use their ﬁrst-period savings plus interest for consumption.
2.3 Factor supply
The demand functions imply that individual savings si form a ﬁxed fraction 1 − e of each agent’s labor
income wi. Each agent inelastically supplies one unit of labor in the ﬁrst period of life. Accordingly, in










In country I, agents choose one of the two national sectors for work in the ﬁrst life-period. Let ωh ∈
(−∞,∞) denote the wage diﬀerential between sectors A and B required by young agent h to work in
5sector A. Young agent h chooses to work in sector A, if wA − ωh > wB and in sector B otherwise. We
assume a continuous cumulative distribution function Φ(·) of young agents with respect to the required
wage diﬀerential.11 Denote the wage diﬀerential by
ω ≡ wA − wB. (8)
Since young agent h with ωh < ω chooses to work in sector A, Φ(ω) gives the fraction of country I’s
young native population choosing to work in sector A.
We assume that M is very large compared to N. Accordingly, the wage in country II is so low that
country I can face a large number of country-II workers who want to migrate to either sector A or B.
Country I can decide on the number of immigrant workers in sectors A and B. By doing so, the country
decides on the number of workers in sector C residually, since we assume an inelastic supply of labor and
full employment.
Accordingly, at given wage rates and a given number of migrants, labor supply in each sector is given by
LA = NΦ(ω) + MA ≥ 0 (9)
LB = N (1 − Φ(ω)) + MB ≥ 0 (10)
LC = M − MA − MB ≥ 0 (11)
Let NΦ(ω) ≡ NA and N(1 − Φ(ω)) ≡ NB in the following.
2.4 Equilibrium
We set the supply of each sector’s output given by equation (1) equal to each sector’s demand expressed
by the individual demand functions times the respective population sizes given by equations (9)-(11). In
any given period t, the following relationships hold:
XA (t) = eα




wA (t − 1)LA (t − 1) + wB (t − 1)LB (t − 1)
pA (t)
(1 + r(t − 1))
XB (t) = eβ






wA (t − 1)LA (t − 1) + wB (t − 1)LB (t − 1)
pB (t)
(1 + r(t − 1))
+(1 − e)θ
wC (t − 1)LC (t − 1)
pB (t)
(1 + r(t − 1)) (13)
11Let us assume the corresponding density function is non-degenerate, i.e. φ(·) > 0∀ωh.
6XC (t) = e(1 − α − β)
wA (t)LA (t) + wB (t)LB (t)
pC (t)
+ e(1 − θ)
wC (t)LC (t)
pC (t)
+(1 − e)(1 − α − β)
wA (t − 1)LA (t − 1) + wB (t − 1)LB (t − 1)
pC (t)
(1 + r(t − 1))
+(1 − e)(1 − θ)
wC (t − 1)LC (t − 1)
pC (t)
(1 + r(t − 1)) (14)





where ψi (t) depends only on r and ψi in the previous period t−1.12 This in turn implies that the value
of output in each sector pi (t)Xi (t) is predetermined in any period: a change in labor supply in a given
sector due to immigration changes the output and the price in that sector such that the value of output
remains constant ψi (t).
Lemma 1 Immigration aﬀects neither the total amount of capital in the world, nor its distribution
across sectors, nor the interest rate.








, i,j ∈ {A,B,C}, i 6= j (16)
for any given period. The capital ratio between sectors is thus predetermined. The resource constraint
(7) implies, by using (2) and (15),
X
i




for any given period, which shows that total capital in each period is a constant share of the sectoral
output values ψi in that period, which, in turn, depend on the values of output in the previous period.
This implies that total capital and labor supply in the initial period completely determine total capital
in subsequent periods. 
Since total capital only depends on the value of sectoral output, which is predetermined, the interest rate
is ﬁxed. An increase in LA due to an increase in immigration would be completely oﬀset by a decrease
in pA and, accordingly, in wages and savings. Immigration does not change total capital and, therefore,
the interest rate, because while it increases the number of savers in country I, savings per capita fall due
to the eﬀect of a price decrease on the wage.13 Immigration increases the physical marginal product of
capital, but not its value.
12The expression for ψi(t) is too long for inclusion in the main text and is left to the appendix.
13Note that this is true under our assumption that capital is made up of savings in the same period.
72.5 Fixed sector choice
We now examine the outcome of a referendum on immigration into sectors A and B in country I. Let
us assume for the moment that the sectoral choice of young natives is given and that none of the three
groups of voters has an absolute majority.
Proposition 1 Suppose the sectoral choice of young natives is ﬁxed. In the absence of an absolute
majority of any one group, majority voting on a pair of immigration quotas into the two sectors results
in the amount of immigration that is preferred by the old,
MA =
αγA(M + NB) − NA[βγB + (1 − α − β)γC]
αγA + βγB + (1 − α − β)γC
,
MB =
βγB(M + NA) − NB[αγA + (1 − α − β)γC]
αγA + βγB + (1 − α − β)γC
,
given MA > 0 and MB > 0. MA = 0 and MB = 0 otherwise.
Proof. We derive individual indirect utility of young natives in country I by substituting the demand
functions, wages (2) and prices (15) into the utility function (4). We have, for i 6= C and t = 1,
v
y
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where superscript y denotes young.
The indirect utility of a retired agent is simply the one-period lag of the fourth term in the above















+ (1 − α − β)ln
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where superscript o denotes old.14
14We omit the sector subscript from v and w in (19) because only the three output prices are aﬀected by immigration in
this expression, which enter utility in the same way regardless of whether an agent worked in sector A or B in the previous
period.
8For the ﬁrst derivative of indirect utility of a young native in sector A with respect to immigration into






















(1 + δ)wA (1)
dwA (1)
dMA (1)
where the ﬁrst and fourth terms are the wage eﬀects. Note that the wage eﬀect in the fourth term is felt
in the second period of lifetime. The second term is the sector-A price eﬀect, while the third term is the












(1 − α − β)γC
LC
. (20)













(1 − α − β)γC
LC
. (21)
That is, immigration into sector A aﬀects workers in sector B and the old only via the price eﬀects: a
decrease in the sector-A price and an increase in the sector-C price. Therefore, the wage eﬀect represented
by the ﬁrst term of (20) is missing in (21).



























(1 − α − β)γC
LC
. (23)
Immigration into sector A (B) aﬀects utility of workers already in the sector in three ways, namely via (i)
a decrease in the wage (ﬁrst term on the right-hand side of (20) and (22)), (ii) a decrease in the sector-A
(B) price (second term) and (iii) an increase in the sector-C price (third term). The total eﬀect is negative
because the negative wage eﬀect dominates the positive sector-A (B) price eﬀect, i.e., 1/e > αγA and
1/e > βγB. Young natives in sector A (B) therefore oppose immigration into their own sector. Their
optimal amount of MA (MB) is zero.
Immigration into sector A (B) aﬀects utility of young natives in the other sector and the old only via the
price eﬀects. (21) and (23) indicate a decrease in the sector-A (B) price and an increase in the sector-C
price. The relative size of the price eﬀects depends on the relative size of the native population in sector
A (B) and the foreign population M.15
15Assume that the population in country II is very large relative to the population in country I. Then, the positive price
eﬀect initially dominates the negative price eﬀect. Young natives support immigration into the sector that is not their own,
and the old support immigration into both sectors. With an increase in MA or MB, this positive net eﬀect of immigration
decreases and eventually becomes negative.




(1 − α − β)γC
LC
. (24)




(1 − α − β)γC
LC
. (25)







(1 − α − β)γC
LC
. (26)









βγBM − (1 − α − β)γCNB
βγB + (1 − α − β)γC

(27)








αγAM − (1 − α − β)γCNA




The choice by old natives is a pair of
Mo
A =
αγA [M + NB] − [βγB + (1 − α − β)γC]NA





βγB [M + NA] − [αγA + (1 − α − β)γC]NB
αγA + βγB + (1 − α − β)γC
. (30)
Given Mo
A > 0 and Mo






B. Hence the median voter
is elderly. 
In our model, the young in both sectors oppose immigration into their respective sectors because such
immigration depresses their wages: these negative eﬀects dominate any positive price eﬀect. However,
they desire immigration into the other sector up to the point where the marginal utility from the decrease
in that sector’s output price is equal to the marginal utility from the increase in the price of output
produced in country II.
The old desire immigration into both sectors such that the marginal utility from the decrease in the price
of both sectors’ output is equal to the marginal increase in the price of output produced in country II.
They do not care about the wage eﬀect of immigration. The pair of quotas chosen by the old represents
10the median position because the young each form a majority with the old on immigration into the sector




A > 0 and Mo
B > 0.
2.6 Endogenous sector choice
In the following, we allow for the sector choice of young natives to respond to immigration. Immigration
changes the wage diﬀerential between sectors A and B and, therefore, the distribution of natives across
these sectors.
The equilibrium distribution of migrant and native workers across sectors A and B is determined by
labor demand (2) and labor supply (10)-(11). Labor supply in sectors A and B is deﬁned implicitly by




















+ MB − LB = 0 (32)
where we substituted for ω by using (8), (2) and (15).
Lemma 2 Immigration into a given sector increases labor supply in both sectors Aand B. But the





























































































 ∈ (0,1) (36)





As a response to immigration into a given sector, some natives choose to switch. Immigration into sector
A, for example, decreases the wage in that sector such that the wage diﬀerential becomes too small
for some to compensate them for working in sector A. They choose sector B rather than sector A for
employment. Immigration into sector B, on the other hand, increases the wage diﬀerential, such that
more natives are now willing to work in sector A than before. Immigration into a given sector thus causes
a movement of natives away from that sector, partially oﬀsetting the initial wage decrease. Immigration
is not totally oﬀset by the sector change of natives. This is because, while immigration into a given sector
decreases the wage in that sector, the ensuing sector switch by natives results in a wage decrease also in
the other sector. As a result, labor supply increases in both sectors, and wages and prices decrease in
both sectors.16
We now derive the majority voting outcome for the case of endogenous sector choice.
Proposition 2. Assume natives can switch sector in response to immigration. Then, in the absence




amount of immigration into sector A that is preferred by workers in sector B and MA
B is the amount of
immigration into sector B that is preferred by workers in sector A.






















(1 − α − β)γC
LC
(37)
16Note that the distribution of natives across sectors resulting from immigration into sector A is diﬀerent from the one
resulting from immigration into sector B. This is because the change in the wage diﬀerential between sectors A and B is





































(1 − α − β)γC
LC
(39)






















































































































































(1 − α − β)γC
LC
(42)






















































































































































(1 − α − β)γC
LC
(45)
We observe that, as a result of sectoral mobility, immigration into a given sector not only has a negative
wage eﬀect and positive price eﬀect in that sector, but also a negative wage eﬀect and a positive price
eﬀect in the other sector. Compared to the case of ﬁxed sector choice, workers experience an additional
positive price eﬀect on goods produced in the other sector, represented by the second term in (40) and
the ﬁrst term in (44), by own-sector immigration. They also experience a negative wage eﬀect and a
13positive price eﬀect in their own sector, represented by the second term in (41) and the ﬁrst term in (43),
by immigration into the other sector. The old experience an additional positive price eﬀect, represented
by the second term in (42) and the ﬁrst term in (45).
The size of the price and wage eﬀects in sectors A and B is smaller compared to the case of ﬁxed sector
choice, because the change in sectoral labor supply due to immigration is smaller: with ﬁxed sector
choice, the marginal immigrant increases sectoral labor supply by 1, ∂LA
∂MA = 1 and ∂LB
∂MB = 1, while
with endogenous sector choice, he increases sectoral labor supply by less than 1, 0 < ∂LA
∂MA < 1 and
0 < ∂LB
∂MB < 1, because of the crowding-out eﬀect on native sectoral labor supply. In other words, sectoral
mobility mitigates price and wage eﬀects of immigration.
Optimal amounts of immigration into sectors A and B are the solutions to solving simultaneously for the
respective ﬁrst-order conditions, i.e. for
young natives in sector A: (40) = 0 and (43) = 0
young natives in sector B: (41) = 0 and (44) = 0
old natives: (42) = 0 and (45) = 0,
subject to the lower and upper bound constraints MA > 0, MB > 0, MA + MB < M.
We know that for the young, the lower constraints on immigration will always be binding, because for
any MA ≥ 0 and MB ≥ 0, marginal utility from immigration into workers’ own sector is always smaller
than marginal utility from immigration into the other sector. Therefore, young natives in sector A choose
MB by setting MA = 0 and solving for (43)=0. Young natives in sector B choose MA by setting MB = 0
and solving for (41)=0.
In sum, young natives in sector A choose (0,MA








B are equal to the solutions to the ﬁrst-order
conditions in (43), (41), (42) and (45), if positive and equal to zero, otherwise.17
The outcome of a majority vote on immigration into a given sector is determined by the young. This is
because the old prefer a higher amount of immigration into each sector than both the young in sector
A or B, since their marginal utility is higher (compare (42) and (45) with (40), (41) and (43), (44),







B.18 That is, for MB
A > 0, the young in sector B
determine immigration into sector A and for MA
B > 0, the young in sector A determine immigration into
sector B. For MB
A = 0 or MA
B = 0, the young in both sectors form a majority on zero immigration in
sector A or B. Finally, for Mo
A = 0 or Mo
B = 0, every native votes for zero immigration into sector A or
B.
17Note that the workers who switch sector as a response to immigration are indiﬀerent as the marginal eﬀect on their
utility is zero (compare section 3.2).
18Weak inequality follows from the fact that immigration is subject to a lower limit of zero.
14
We report numerical solutions in Table 1 below to show the result of the majority voting outcome for
reasonable parameter values. We ﬁnd that, for the parameter values chosen, no positive solutions to
MB
A or MA
B exist. In other words, there are no values MA > 0 and MB > 0 at which the positive price
eﬀects are dominating the negative eﬀects on price C and workers’ wages. The young in both sectors will
therefore vote against immigration not only into their own sector, but also into the other sector. The
outcome of a majority vote is MA = 0 and MB = 0.
3 Social welfare analysis
In the previous section, we determined the outcome of a majority vote on the amount of sector-speciﬁc
immigration. In the following, we determine the amount of immigration that is socially optimal, i.e. the
amount chosen by a benevolent social planner who simultaneously determines immigration into sectors
A and B.






BNB + voNo, i=A,B. (46)
3.1 Fixed sector choice














































(1 − α − β)γC
LC
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(1 − α − β)γC
LC
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Immigration into sector A(B) has a positive price eﬀect on good A(B) and a negative price eﬀect on good
15C for all three groups of voters, and it has a negative wage eﬀect for the group of natives working in
sector A(B).
In optimum, the marginal welfare of immigration into sector A via its eﬀect on the wage and price in
sector A (if positive) equals its (negative) marginal welfare via the eﬀect on the price in sector C. Similarly,
a positive marginal welfare of optimal immigration into sector B via its eﬀect on the wage and price in
sector B equals its negative marginal welfare via the eﬀect on the price in sector C.
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− (1 − α − β)γCNA(NA + NB + No)
αγANB + (−
1
e + αγA)NA + (1 − α − β)γC(NA + NB + No)
,0
!
for (αγA − 1
e)NA + αγA(NB + No) > 0 and (βγB − 1
e)NB + βγB(NA + No) < 0, given M∗
A ≥ 0 and
M∗
B ≥ 0, respectively. Socially optimal immigration into both sectors is zero, otherwise.
Proof. We simultaneously solve for (49)=0 and (50)=0 with respect to MA and MB subject to their
lower and upper bounds MA ≥ 0, MB ≥ 0 and MA + MB ≤ M. Given MA ≥ 0, MB ≥ 0 and
MA + MB ≤ M, the marginal welfare eﬀect of immigration into sector A is positive (and, therefore,
MA > 0) if and only if (αγA− 1
e)NA+αγANB > 0. Analogously, the marginal welfare eﬀect of immigration
into sector B is positive (and, therefore, MB > 0) if and only if (βγB − 1
e)NB + βγBNA > 0, as can be
seen by transforming (49) and (50).

Socially optimal amounts of immigration M∗
A and M∗
B are likely to be smaller than the respective majority
voting outcomes, which correspond to the preferences of the old Mo
A and Mo
B, because the old do not
take the negative eﬀect of immigration on wages into account. Simulation results reported in Table 1
show that, for chosen parameter values, socially optimal immigration into both sectors A and B is zero
in the case of ﬁxed sector choice.
163.2 Endogenous sector choice
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where we can further substitute for the change in total sectoral labor supply due to immigration using
(33)-(36).
The ﬁrst square bracket gives the price eﬀects of immigration: positive eﬀects on prices A and B and a
negative eﬀect on price C, aﬀecting all three groups of voters: the young in sectors A and B as well as the
old. The second term gives the negative wage eﬀects on the young in sectors A and B. The third term
gives the eﬀect on utility of the young that switch sector due to immigration, for given wages.19 We can
19The third term comes from the fact that we compute the derivative of the products of group-speciﬁc indirect utilities
with group sizes, both of which depend on immigration. Applying the product rule, we get the derivative of indirect utilities
times group size (terms 1 and 2) plus the derivatives of group sizes times indirect utilities (term 3).
17show that the third square bracket is negative - that is, immigration into sector A reduces wage A more
strongly than wage B. As a consequence, natives switch from sector A into sector B. Now, given equal
job conditions in both sectors, utility is higher in sector A than in sector B, since wA > wB. However,
we have assumed that job conditions in A are considered worse than in B, such that workers require a
compensating wage diﬀerential for working in sector A. Therefore, at the margin, utility derived from
wages adjusted for job conditions does not change for those who switch sector.20 The marginal eﬀect of
immigration for natives who switch sector is zero.
In order to solve for socially optimal immigration in the case of endogenous sector choice, we again
simultaneously solve for (53)=0 and (54)=0 with respect to MA and MB subject to their lower bounds
MA ≥ 0, MB ≥ 0 and upper bound MA + MB ≤ M. The solutions to MA, MB are quadratic due to
the quadratic terms in (53) and (54). We report numerical solutions below. We ﬁnd that, for reasonable
parameter values, no positive solutions to MA or MB exist. In other words, there are no values MA > 0
and MB > 0 for which any positive net price eﬀects of immigration are dominating the negative wage
eﬀects of immigration on society. Hence, for chosen parameter values, socially optimal immigration is
MA = 0 and MB = 0 also in the case of endogenous sector choice.
3.3 Immigration and native mobility across sectors
Policymakers typically suggest two ways to solve the problem of excess labor demand: 1) the enhancement
of sectoral mobility of natives21 or 2) the immigration of foreign workers. The two policies are often
perceived to be mutually exclusive: undertaking one policy is supposed to make the other one redundant.
This would imply that immigration is socially more desirable in an immobile than in a mobile society.
In the following, we show that whether this is true or not depends on the size of native and immigrant
working populations.
Proposition 4. Immigration into sector A(B) is socially more desirable when natives are mobile between









Proof. In order to compare the welfare eﬀect of immigration into sector A with and without sectoral
mobility, we compare (49) and (53). Suﬃcient conditions for the welfare eﬀect to be higher with mobility
than without are that i) the positive price eﬀects are larger with mobility than without and ii) the negative
wage eﬀects are smaller with mobility than without.
20vA(xA+z) = vB(xB), where x is the consumption good bundle purchased with money and expressed in terms of sector-
speciﬁc wages and the prices, and z is the compensating variation for working in sector A compared with sector B. Compare
Rosen (1986).
21If switching sector comes at a cost, a change in the sectoral wage diﬀerential will not prompt as many natives to switch,
as it would otherwise do. A policy of enhancing native sectoral mobility could consist of reducing this cost. We compare
the two extreme cases of no mobility versus mobility restricted only by heterogeneous job preferences for the purpose of
illustration.





















With sectoral mobility, immigration into sector A decreases prices not only in sector A but also in sector
B. For the price eﬀects to be larger with than without sectoral mobility, the ratio of labor supply in sector
A relative to labor supply in sector B must be large enough.




























With sector mobility, immigration into sector A decreases wages not only in sector A but also in sector
B. For the wage eﬀects to be smaller with than without sectoral mobility, the ratio of labor supply in











is a suﬃcient condition for immigration into sector A to have a larger positive eﬀect on social welfare
under sectoral mobility than under no sectoral mobility.
Analogously for immigration into sector B.

4 Simulation of immigration quotas
Optimal immigration quota derived above depend on the parameter values of our stylized model. In the
case of endogenous sector choice, the expressions for optimal immigration are complex enough to best be
derived numerically. We therefore use existing parameter estimates to provide a sense of the magnitude
of optimal immigration into sectors, both for the groups of young and old, as well as for society overall.
19This way, we can also easily compare the outcome of a majority vote with the social optimum. Since
our stylized model is one of two countries, one home and one foreign, we think of immigration quotas as
quotas for one (major) foreign country.
4.1 Parameter choice
For the relative size of the native working population NA + NB and the foreign working population M
that comprises potential immigrants, we choose a ratio of 1 to 2. This way, we take account of the fact
that the population of potential migrants, even if only from one country, can potentially be quite large
and signiﬁcantly outnumber native workers. We assume that slightly more workers are in the tradables
sector B than in the non-tradables sector A and use NA = 0.4 and NB = 0.6. The relative size of the old
within the native population is set to No = 0.9 since, according to ILO (2007) statistics, the share of the
retired is almost equal to that of the working population in a typical OECD country.
For spending shares in consumption, we use estimates of the shares of spending on tradables and non-
tradables in a typical OECD country from the Penn World Table. For domestic demand, we use α = 0.5
for the non-tradable good produced in sector A and β = 0.25 for the tradable good produced in sector B,
which implies 1 − α − β =0.25 for the imported good produced in sector C. For foreign demand, we use
θ = 0.5 for the good imported from sector B, which implies 1 − θ = 0.5 for the good produced in sector
C. For wage shares in production, we use estimates for a typical OECD country from ILO (2000). We
set γA = 0.7, γB = 0.7 and γC = 0.7 in the three sectors A, B, C.
We choose a discount rate of 0.5 that corresponds to a yearly discount rate of 0.02 for the length of 20
years and a consumption rate of 0.6. For the world interest rate r, we use 0.15, as Kohler and Felbermayr
(2007). We calibrate pA and, as implied by relative prices, pB and pC as well as capital stocks KA, KB
and KC according to a previous-period interest rate rt−1 of 0.15, equal to the current interest rate.
We also show simulations for diﬀerent values of the size of the native labor force, the labor intensity
in domestic production, spending shares in domestic consumption and the output value in the previous
period, which determines the value of output in subsequent periods according to (15) together with
(60)-(62).
Table 2 summarizes the baseline parameter values described above and reports corresponding equilibrium
values of the model.
4.2 Simulation results
Table 1 reports simulation results on immigration quotas for no sectoral mobility (panel a) and sectoral
mobility (panel b). For each case, we show group-speciﬁc quotas as well as the social optimum for
immigration into both sectors A and B. For no sectoral mobility, we ﬁnd that old natives occupy the
median position, as stated in Proposition 1. They prefer more immigration into a given sector than young
natives working in that sector, but less immigration than young natives working in the other sector. Their
preferred amount of immigration is strictly positive, whereas socially optimal immigration is zero for all
chosen parameter values. Majority voting therefore results in immigration that is too high from a social
20point of view.
For sectoral mobility, we ﬁnd that the old still vote for strictly positive immigration into both sectors.
Their optimal amounts of immigration are even higher than in the case of no sectoral mobility, which
is due to the fact that the sum of the two positive price eﬀects for the old is larger in utility terms
than the single positive price eﬀect derived from immigration without sectoral mobility.22 The young
in both sectors still vote against immigration into their own sector, because for given parameter values,
the larger positive price eﬀects from immigration are still not large enough to cover the negative wage
eﬀect. Besides, they now also vote against immigration into the other sector, because the negative eﬀect
on their wage due to sectoral crowding-out is not compensated by the increase in positive price eﬀects.
The majority voting outcome in the case of sectoral mobility therefore is zero and equal to the social
optimum, which is also zero.
In columns 2-5 of the table, we show results for variations of a single parameter at a time, so that they
can be compared with results for the baseline in column 1. In column 2, the native work force in sector
B is smaller: NB = 0.5. We can see that, as a result, old natives and young natives in sector A (in
case of no sectoral mobility) prefer more immigration into sector B. The reason is that the marginal
eﬀect of immigration into sector B on the price in that sector is now larger. Since the old and the young
in sector A choose immigration into sector B such that marginal price eﬀects in all sectors are equal,
optimal immigration into sector B is higher. Note also that optimal immigration into sector A for the
old is smaller in the case with no sectoral mobility, because optimality requires that the marginal price
eﬀects in sector A and B are the same (both are larger). With sectoral mobility, optimal immigration
into sector A for the old is slightly higher as well, because of the spill-over eﬀect of immigration into a
given sector on the price in the other sector caused by workers who switch.
In column 3, we choose a higher wage share in sector A, γA = 0.8. In this case, the eﬀect of a price
decrease in sector A is larger, and optimal immigration into sector A increases for both the old as well as
the young in sector B. As a consequence, optimal immigration into sector B decreases for the old, who
equate marginal price eﬀects in A and B, for no sectoral mobility. For sectoral mobility, an increase in γA
increases utility derived from immigration into both sectors, due to spill-over eﬀects. Since the marginal
eﬀect from immigration into sector A is larger, however, optimal immigration into sector B decreases.
We also consider an increase in the home bias in consumption, in the form of a higher domestic spending
share on sector A: α = 0.6 in column 4. As a result, the marginal eﬀect of a decrease in price A increases
relative to the marginal eﬀect of an increase in price C. Optimal sector-A immigration for the old and, in
case of no sectoral mobility, the young in sector B increases and is even higher than in column 3. Due to
the decrease in the marginal eﬀect on price C, optimal immigration into sector B for the young in sector
A now also increases in the case of no sectoral mobility. It remains constant for the old, who compensate
fully by an increase in preferred immigration into sector A.
22Note that the negative eﬀect on the price of the imported good is the same.
21Finally, we show results for an increase in the value of previous-period output in sector B ψBt−1 = 2.17.23
We can see that results for no sectoral mobility remain the same, as marginal eﬀects of current immigration
are independent of previous-period output values. However, in the case of sectoral mobility, a change in
ψBt−1 changes the eﬀect of immigration on total sectoral labor supply, because it changes ψBt and ψAt.24
For chosen parameter values, both ψBt and ψAt increase, and immigration into a given sector increases
labor supply in that sector less strongly than before. In other words, sectoral crowding-out increases,
which in turn increases the positive price eﬀects and, therefore, optimal immigration for the old increases.
5 Conclusion
We determine the outcome of a majority vote on immigration into sectors as well as the socially optimal
amount, assuming that natives require a compensating wage diﬀerential for working in one sector rather
than in another. We focus on immigrants who are selected to serve as substitutes for natives in a given
sector, mapping situations of sectoral labor supply shortages that are present in many OECD countries.
We identify both the wage and the price eﬀects of such immigration in an overlapping generations model
with three diﬀerent groups of natives: young natives working in sector A, young natives working in
sector B and the old. We ﬁnd that the young are against immigration into their own sector, because
the negative wage eﬀect dominates the positive price eﬀect. The old and the young in the other sector,
who are aﬀected by immigration only via price eﬀects, but not via wage eﬀects, support immigration and
determine the outcome of the majority vote. As a result, a majority supports a strictly positive amount
of immigration into both sectors.
We then allow for the sector choice of natives to change endogenously with immigration. In this case,
optimal amounts of immigration depend on parameter values. We calibrate model parameters according
to existing data and estimates and run a number of simulations to determine immigration quota outcomes.
We ﬁnd that, while young natives still prefer zero immigration into their own sector, they now also prefer
zero immigration into the other sector. This is because immigration into a given sector now has a
negative wage eﬀect in both sectors, due to some natives switching sector. This wage eﬀect via crowding-
out, though smaller, still dominates positive price eﬀects for plausible parameter values. The old now
prefer a larger amount of immigration into both sectors, because of an increase in the positive price
eﬀects. The young in both sectors form a majority and vote for zero immigration into both sectors.
Further, we ﬁnd that, for the range of parameter values used, socially optimal immigration into sectors
A and B is zero both without and with sectoral mobility. Therefore, the majority voting outcome is too
high in the case of no sectoral mobility, but optimal in the case of sectoral mobility from a social point
of view.
23Note that this could be due to a change in initial capital or labor supply, according to (15) together with (60)-(62).
24See (33)-(36) together with (60)-(62) in the Appendix.
22Appendix: Sectoral output values
In Section 2, we derived sectoral equilibrium prices pit as functions of the constants ψit and sector outputs





We can easily see that the values of sectoral outputs are equal to the constants, expressions of which are
given by the following:
ψAt = z [(γAψAt−1 + γBψBt−1)α(1 − eγC(1 − θ)) (60)
+γCψCt−1αeγBθ]
ψBt = z [(γAψAt−1 + γBψBt−1)(β(1 − eγC) (61)
+eγCθ(1 − α)) + γCψCt−1(1 − eγAα)θ]
ψCt = z [(γAψAt−1 + γBψBt−1)(1 − α − β) (62)




(2 + δ)[(1 − eαγA − eβγB)(1 − (1 − θ)eγC) − (1 − α − β)e2γBγCθ]
.
As the constants and, therefore, sectoral output values, only depend on previous-period output values
and exogenous parameters, they are exogenous in any given period and determined by initial sectoral
output values ψA0, ψB0 and ψC0.
23Tables
Table 1: Results on Immigration Quotas
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Base- Smaller Higher Higher Higher
line native wage share spending share initial value
labor force in sector A on sector A of output
(a): No sectoral mobility
Immigration into sector A
Group-speciﬁc optimum
Workers in sector A 0 0 0 0 0
Workers in sector B 1.2 1.2 1.27 1.52 1.2
Old natives 1.1 1.05 1.2 1.4 1.1
Social optimum 0 0 0 0 0
Immigration into sector B
Group-speciﬁc optimum
Workers in sector A 0.7 0.75 0.7 1.03 0.7
Workers in sector B 0 0 0 0 0
Old natives 0.15 0.23 0.1 0.15 0.15
Social optimum 0 0 0 0 0
(b): Sectoral mobility
Immigration into sector A
Group-speciﬁc optimum
Workers in sector A 0 0 0 0 0
Workers in sector B 0 0 0 0 0
Old natives 1.2055 1.2078 1.2731 1.5233 1.2069
Social optimum 0 0 0 0 0
Immigration into sector B:
Group-speciﬁc optimum
Workers in sector A 0 0 0 0 0
Workers in sector B 0 0 0 0 0
Old natives 0.2027 0.3039 0.1320 0.2014 0.2034
Social optimum 0 0 0 0 0
Note: In column (2), the native labor force in B is NB =0.5. In column (3), the wage share in sector A is
γA =0.8. In column (4), the spending share of natives on goods produced in sector A is α =0.6. In column (5),
the previous-period value of output in sector B is ψBt−1 =2.17.
24Table 2: Benchmark - Calibration and Equilibrium
Functional forms Parameters Quantities Prices
Household utility per period: Cobb-Douglas
Home uI = αlnxA + β lnxB + (1 − α − β)lnxC
good produced in sector A α=0.5 Xd
A=0.5015 pA=0.8478
good produced in sector B β=0.25 Xd
B=0.2650 pB=0.8024
good produced in sector C 1 − α − β=0.25 Xd
C=0.6155 pC=0.3454
Foreign uII = θlnxB + (1 − θ)lnxC
good produced in sector B θ=0.5 Xd
B=0.4698









wage share γA=0.7 Xs
A=0.5015 pA=0.8478





wage share γB=0.7 Xs
B=0.7348 pB=0.8024
Foreign





wage share γC=0.7 Xs
C=1.7068 pC=0.3454
Labor endowment and allocation
Home
workers in sector A NA=0.4 wA=0.7442
workers in sector B NB=0.6 wB=0.6879
retired No=0.9
Foreign
workers in sector C M= 2 wC=0.2063
Capital endowment and allocation
Home
Consumption rate e=0.6 (δ=0.5)
sector A pAX0
A(KA) = r KA=0.8505 r = 0.15
sector B pBX0
B(KB) = r KB=1.1792 r = 0.15
Foreign
sector C pCX0
C(KC) = r KC=1.1792 r = 0.15
Note: We assume that the native sectoral population and the interest rate remain unchanged from the previous
period, and that pAt−1=1, pBt−1=1.5, pCt−1=0.8. Then, ψAt−1=0.5383, ψBt−1=1.4412 and ψCt−1=1.9570.
Implied values of sectoral output in period t are ψAt=0.4252, ψBt=0.5896, ψCt=0.5896.
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